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‘Understanding’ and the Illusion of Control 
Over the past decade, Western military doctrines concerned with matters of irregular warfare and 
counterinsurgency have emphasised the requirement for properly ‘understanding’ the social, political 
and cultural environments in which those militaries may operate; the so-called human and socio-
political ‘terrain’. This has led to a number of advancements and initiatives designed to facilitate the 
way that militaries may enhance that understanding. One of those initiatives has been the 
emergence from within the British military of a doctrine – JDP 04 ‘Understanding’ - designed for that 
purpose. Using that doctrine and other subsequent publications as a template, this article will 
examine the utility of ‘understanding’ for those commanders seeking to match military activities with 
political ends. It proposes that while any advances in understanding the operating environment are 
to be applauded, the ‘understanding’ of greatest importance is that relating to the feasibility of the 
strategic objectives at hand. If those objectives lack inherent feasibility, then the development of 
subordinate forms of understanding, particularly in relation to the socio-political dynamics of target 
societies, will likely only serve to slow the process of failure.   
Introduction 
‘Understanding’ is a word, and a concept, that has risen to prominence over the past few years in 
Western military thought.1 The faltering steps taken by US and British forces in Afghanistan and Iraq 
allied to a prediction by those respective militaries, and others, of the fundamentally population-
centric nature of future conflicts has led to an emphasis upon properly understanding the political, 
social and cultural environments that their armed forces might be projected into.2 In particular the 
ethnographic composition of the countries or regions concerned; the structures and alignments of 
political and social elites; and the loyalties, needs and wants of local populations - the socio-political 
‘terrain’, in other words. The recent emergence of corresponding doctrines, structures and 
educational programmes designed to engender and encourage the developments of such forms of 
understanding suggests that the intellectual thrust to properly comprehend the social and political 
dynamics of the ground-level environment will become an increasingly important aspect of modern 
military thought. 
The extent to which this is the case is evident in the respective approaches taken by Western 
militaries over recent years. The US responded to the early difficulties encountered in Iraq and 
Afghanistan by formulating the anthropological Human Terrain System (HTS), recasting its entire 
counterinsurgency doctrine with a heavy emphasis upon cultural intelligence, creating new 
institutions such as a cultural ‘centre of excellence’ and, ‘[R]evamping pre-deployment training to 
                                                          
1 See Patrick Porter, Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes (Hurst, London, 2009) 
2 Current British doctrine states, ‘We can assume that many future military operations will be amongst the 
people and under the glare of the global media’. See Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 3-11 Decision-Making and 
Problem Solving: Human and Organisational Factors (Ministry of Defence, 2013) Ch1, 1. 
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include instruction on the local population and its customs and practices’.3 Australian Army doctrine 
now speaks of ‘complex human terrain’, ‘cultural competence and capability’ and advocates the 
requirement for ‘sophisticated societal, cultural and linguistic understanding’, while its French 
counterpart recently advocated the need for, ‘[A] sense of where we operate…an understanding of 
the human environment and what the expectations of local leaders and populations are’.4 But the 
British military has pushed forward even further. The emergence in 2010 of Joint Doctrine 
Publication (JDP) 0-4 ‘Understanding’ was significant insofar that it represented the first 
commissioning of a manual specifically devoted to the subject of ‘understanding’ in and of itself.5 
The trend in this respect has been further bolstered by the publication in late 2015 of the Ministry of 
Defence (MOD) Strategic Trends Programme: Future Operating Environment 2035 (FOE 35) advisory 
paper.6 In its attempts to forecast the likely character of conflict over the next two decades and 
beyond, this latest publication’s stated aim is to inform future Defence ‘capability development’. 
And central to that ambition is the primary importance of 'understanding’ in enabling a more 
informed and effective employment of Britain’s armed forces.7 Overseas engagement, further 
education and cultural immersion are just some of the ways in which this understanding will be 
encouraged. 
But while doctrine publications such as JDP 04 and institutional think-pieces such as FOE 35 
extol the virtues of understanding, knowledge, judgement, insight and decision-making in the 
military context, other non-formal publications provide additional food for thought in this respect. 
2010, the year that JDP 04 first appeared, also saw the appearance of a largely unnoticed piece titled 
‘Talking to the Enemy: Informal Conflict Termination in Iraq’ in the pages of the in-house journal 
British Army Review. 8 Authored by Iraq veteran Brigadier Sandie Storrie, the article dealt with the 
subject of the challenges faced by US and British forces in pacifying their respective areas of 
                                                          
3 See Montgomery McFate and Janice H. Laurence (eds) Social Science Goes to War (London, Hurst and Co, 
2015) ix-xi. The US doctrine referred to was FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (2006), now revised as FM 3-24 
Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (2014). The HTT program no longer exists, but as the authors’ state 
in their introduction, any form of irregular warfare in the future will likely prioritize the understanding of 
human terrain. 
4 For Australian doctrine see Future Land warfare report 2014, Directorate of Future Land Warfare, Australian 
Army, http://apo.org.au/node/40925. See also Future Land Warfare Report 2014: Adaptive Campaigning: 
Army’s Future Land Operating Concept, 19, 37 http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/Publications/Key-
Publications/Adaptive-Campaigning. For its French counterpart see FT 01-ENG ‘Winning the Battle, Building 
Peace: Land Forces in Present and Future Conflicts’ (Armee de Terre, 2007) 29.  
5 JDP (Joint Doctrine Publication) 04. (Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Shrivenham, Dec 2010). 
Presently undergoing revision prior to re-publication. 
6 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/484861/20151203-
DCDC_FOE_35.pdf. Published December 2015. 
7 Ibid. Indeed, FOE 35 states that the primary implication of the proposed Future Operating Environment 2035 
is, ‘[T]he increased and vital importance of the ‘understand’ function’ pp. 29-20 
8 Storrie, A. J. S. ‘Talking to the "Enemy": Informal Conflict Termination in Iraq’. British Army Review No 148 
(Winter 2009/10), 13-27. 
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operations in Iraq 2007-8. While doctrine examines the intellectual basis and theoretical benefits of 
‘understanding’, Storrie portrayed the glaring difficulties and counterintuitive consequences of 
actually trying to ‘operationalize’ that understanding on the ground. Between them, military theory 
in the form of JDP-04 and FOE 35 and operational praxis in the form of Storrie’s experience of 
southern Iraq intersect neatly upon the subject that this article seeks to explore further, namely the 
value and utility of ‘understanding’ in contributing to the success of military operations.9 For it is 
clear that the theoretical benefits of ‘understanding’ in its many forms in the context of the use of 
military force are exposed in reality as being highly fragile, with the potential to expose both 
practitioners and their political masters to unappetizing and unforeseen consequences.  
On that basis this article confronts a number of issues that emerge in connection to the 
subject of ‘understanding’ in conflict scenarios, not only in terms of acquisition but also its 
instrumentalization, and focuses upon a series of key themes in the theoretical and practical aspects 
of the debate. The first part of the article examines some of the motivating factors behind the push 
for understanding among western militaries and the British Army in particular. But it goes on to 
identify the unhelpfully theoretical and highly reductive nature of a doctrinal approach to the 
subject and the limited ability of military education, particularly in the British context, to 
compensate. It then progresses to identifying practical hindrances to the cultivation and utilization 
of understanding. In particular it will examine the fragility of the concept as it travels through 
differing strategic, operational and tactical perspectives, the often problematic relationship between 
our understanding of target societies and the values that we as the West seek to promote therein, 
and the complexities involved when trying to employ that understanding in the context of the 
transformative change wrought by military operations. Finally, the article will focus upon the Anglo-
US experience in Iraq 2006-2008 to illustrate precisely how a series of unintended consequences can 
result from these complicating factors, and some of the wider conclusions that emerge.  
To be clear, this article does not dispute the notion that the acquisition of ‘understanding’ 
should remain a fundamental pursuit at all levels of war. Neither does it seek to discredit current 
doctrine. But the need for understanding is not the issue under debate. Rather, as this article 
illustrates, it is the inherently problematic translation of a theoretical good into a practical benefit 
that is of interest. The fact remains that both doctrine and habit present the acquisition or 
generation of knowledge and understanding as a uniformly positive process, i.e. as a fundamental 
component of success in military operations. Yet as this article will illustrate, ‘understanding’ 
generates actions and effects that are subject to precisely the same sort of unpredictable or 
                                                          
9 The term ‘success’ in this context is taken to mean the ‘ideal’ use of military force for political effect i.e. the 
achievement of Basil Liddell-Hart’s ‘better peace’.  
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uncontrollable variables that are a fundamental consequence of the use of military force to achieve 
political objectives.  
 
Why Understand? 
Why seek to understand? A potentially ridiculous question except for the fact that, blithe quotations 
of Sun Tzu aside, the explicit drive for understanding in the context of military operations appears to 
be a markedly recent phenomenon. Rupert Smith’s 2005 concept of modern war no longer being 
industrial in nature but of being instead a ‘war amongst the people’ lent initial impetus to this notion 
of a fundamental change in the paradigm of conflict, one that required the necessary  adjustment in 
the way that militaries conceptualised the likely future battleground.10 And while the British 
doctrinal drive to understand the human dimensions of that battlefield has come to the fore 
relatively recently, the US military had, as stated, already moved to address shortcomings in that 
respect with the recruitment of anthropologist-staffed Human Terrain Teams to advise every 
Brigade, Division and Corps in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the aforementioned re-writing of its 
existing counterinsurgency doctrine to reflect a heavy emphasis upon socio-cultural knowledge and 
understanding.11 As Montgomery McFate explains in Social Science goes to War, if the indigenous 
population is now the so-called ‘centre of gravity’ then this form of knowledge is perhaps the critical 
component of counterinsurgency and complex stabilisation operations.12 With Western militaries 
now focusing upon such types of conflict as indicative of the future, and with past failures in mind, 
the motivations propelling the requirement for ‘understanding’ now and going forward are obvious.  
Of course, the supposed newness of matters of culture and anthropology aligned to the use 
of military force is entirely ahistorical. Such intellectual concerns were fundamental to European 
imperial designs.13 And there were some truly sophisticated attitudes at play in certain quarters 
during the period of post-colonial Counterinsurgency too.14 But Imperial and post Second World War 
precedents notwithstanding, there is undoubtedly a recrudescence in modern military thought of 
this particular intellectual tradition. However there is a subtle difference between what McFate or 
                                                          
10 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London, Allen Lane, 2005) 
11Montgomery Mc Fate and Janice H. Laurence, ‘Unveiling the Human Terrain System’ in McFate and Laurence 
(eds) Social Science Goes to War, 21. 
12 Ibid, 2 
13 For more on Colonial era attitudes in this respect see Erik Linstrom, ‘The Politics of Psychology in the British 
Empire 1898-1960’ Past and Present no 215 (May 2012), 195-233, Toyin Falola and Mathew Heaton The 
History of Nigeria, (Cambridge, 1999), 70 –74, Stuart M. Persell ‘Joseph Chailley-Bert and the Importance of 
the Union Colonial Francaise’ Historical Journal 17/1 March 1974, Bernard Cohn, Colonialism and its Forms of 
Knowledge: the British in India (Princeton, 1996) and James Hevia, Imperial Security State: British Colonial 
Knowledge and Empire Building in Asia (Cambridge, 2012). 
14 See Kenneth Payne ‘Social Psychology in Classic Counterinsurgency writing’ Defence Studies 13/1 (2013),  
80-98. For Vietnam, see Gerald C. Hickey A Window on a War: An Anthropologist in the Vietnam Conflict (Texas 
Tech University Press, Lubbock 2002). 
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certain colonial historians might refer to as ‘knowledge’, and what modern doctrine refers to as 
‘understanding’. In the context of this article the former might be helpfully conceived as, ‘that which 
is known in a particular field or in total; and the facts and information thereof’.15 Indeed, facts and 
information are important. They were the stock in trade of the British frontier colonial officer, and 
the Human Terrain Teams (HTT’s) operating in Afghanistan a century later appear no different.16 But 
while the value of this sort of situational knowledge is not disputed in context, this article will 
illustrate that in doctrinal terms at least, ‘understanding’ is distinct from mere ‘knowledge’. It also 
observes that although the Anglo-US militaries in particular have chosen to emphasise the value  of 
‘understanding’, it begs the obvious question as to why, at the campaign level, Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Libya have to all intents and purposes been characterised by ignominious failure or unpromising 
quagmire.17 What exactly has the thrust for ‘understanding’ brought us? 
 
Understanding, Doctrine and Education 
‘Military mindsets seem to favour taking an idea or abstraction, turning it into very 
detailed doctrine and then requiring a dogmatic approach to utilizing it’18 
 
Returning to the subject of British doctrine specifically, one obvious and entirely legitimate question 
is why wait until now to query an obscure manual that was first published over half a decade ago?  
The answer is twofold.  Firstly there appears to be an increasing adherence in the British military, as 
indicated by the recent publication of FOE 35, to the notion of ‘understanding’ as being absolutely 
critical to the achievement of mission success. Secondly, both JDP-04 and FOE 35 are symptomatic of 
a problem that this article seeks to explore, namely the tendency to espouse the need for a 
capability without properly intellectualising the debate; something has become particularly apparent 
on this particular subject. But the fact that that the term has achieved sudden and accelerated 
prominence is unsurprising. The chastening experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan, the evident failure 
of the Libyan intervention, and the byzantine complexity of the Syrian civil war have underpinned 
the notion  of an exponentially more complex ‘future character of conflict’, and placed renewed 
emphasis upon the ability to properly comprehend the social, political and cultural landscape in 
                                                          
15 www.oxforddictionaries.com   
16 As one former HTT member stated, ‘Over six months I would get very tired of asking the same few things 
over and over again: “What tribe do you belong to? Is that part of such-and-such tribe? Is there a bigger tribe 
you are a part of? Is there a smaller sub-tribe below yours? How about below that one? Ted Callaghan, ‘An 
Anthropologist at War in Afghanistan’ in McFate and Laurence (eds) Social Science Goes to War, 105. The 
Frontier officer asked essentially the same questions. See Hevia, 114. 
17 For the example of Libya, see Alan J. Kuperman, ‘A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO’s 
Libya Campaign’ International Security 38/1 (2013) 105-136 
18 Steve Cornell, ‘The Operational: As Valid And As Dangerous As Any Other Abstraction’, Military Operations, 
Volume 3, Issue No. 2, (Winter 2016),  11-13. 
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which the country’s armed forces operate.19 And because of its proximity to events on the ground, it 
is the Army which is most often to be heard exhorting the need to ‘understand’. The irony being that 
it is not entirely evident that those making such utterances actually understand what they mean by 
the term ‘understanding’. This statement is not meant to be patronising. It is simply a recognition 
that practitioners are trying to dovetail one of the most intellectually testing human concepts 
(understanding) with what may potentially be the most testing human activity (war and conflict), 
and two do not make comfortable bedfellows. 
Importantly, both JDP 04 and FOE 35 see ‘understanding’ as existing not for the simple 
intellectual benefit of the individual or organisation, but as there to facilitate actions that lead to 
outcomes. In this context, understanding is instrumental. It is about providing the insight and 
foresight required for effective decision-making (author’s italics).20 It is the leveraging of varieties of 
information and knowledge on the part of those (military and non-military) concerned with planning 
and prosecuting military operations at a number of levels so as to afford the greatest chance of 
achieving the desired end state. By those terms, understanding societies or peoples is not simply 
about comprehension. It is also about the accurate calculation of effect upon them. This is an 
important distinction, for it is this calculation that that is the most difficult aspect of the equation to 
get right.21   
The fundamental problem for any military doctrine that honours understanding is that it has 
to simultaneously honour uncertainty, ambiguity and dissent. And in the context of a collective and 
unified approach to matters, which is what doctrine ultimately seeks to encourage, these are 
unhelpful contradictions. Not that militaries are uncomfortable with the notion of uncertainty or 
ambiguity per se: Clausewitz’s ‘fog’ and ‘friction’ are recognised as fundamental aspect of warfare 
and both are built in to any campaign plan. But where ‘understanding’ is concerned, both as a 
process and as a state of affairs, one is dealing with a phenomenon held by psychologists to be 
fundamentally individualistic, unique and personal. One person’s understanding of a subject, a 
problem or an issue is not necessarily another person’s understanding of the same. Yet for militaries, 
which operate by way of the chain of command, it has to be. The nature of military operations does 
not, as a rule, allow each and every individual within that chain the freedom to adhere to their own 
                                                          
19 The Future Character of Conflict (FCOC) proposes that the future battle-space will be ‘Complex, Cluttered, 
Congested, Connected and Constrained. DCDC Strategic Trends Program ‘Future Character of Conflict’ 
(Ministry of Defence 2010), 16. See also ‘Building Stability Overseas Strategy’. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/building-stability-overseas-strategy  
20 See JDP O4, Chapter 2 ‘The Fundamentals of Understanding’, 1. 
21 Interestingly, US doctrine does not provides a definition of ‘understanding’ per se, although the term is used 
repeatedly throughout its flagship Joint Publication (JP) 01: Doctrine of the Armed forces of the United States, 
its Joint Operational Planning Doctrine, and its Counterinsurgency doctrine . Indeed, it is mentioned 181 times 
in the latter.  
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personal comprehension or insight. Although information, insight and knowledge may flow from 
bottom to top, resulting orders, instructions or directions flow in one direction only; top to bottom. 
In layman’s terms, the commander’s understanding is his subordinates’ understanding, such a 
process acting as the unifying element in what would otherwise be an uncontrollable mass of 
competing ideas and actions. But what does this mean, for example, for the western military 
philosophy of Mission Command?22 Based upon the recognition that local commanders have a 
better understanding of the problems facing them than their distant superiors, and hence should be 
allowed latitude as to how they fulfil their objectives, it encourages the development of multiple 
understandings of a particular problem at different levels. That might be helpful in fighting a mobile 
battle against a conventional enemy force, but how does it apply to the complex realm of political, 
cultural and societal understanding, with multiple commanders operating in parallel and in 
sequence? 
So it is acknowledged that the authors of JDP 04 et al have a hugely difficult task. The 
fundamental complexities of dissecting a concept as complex and layered as ‘understanding’ can be 
easily imagined. Incorporating the fruits of three millennia of intellectual enquiry into tens of pages 
of doctrine and making it both comprehensible and functional is no easy task. But acknowledging 
that, and without even considering some of the more basic epistemological queries, fundamental 
questions arise. If we talk about understanding, what should we be trying to understand, exactly? 
Why should we understand it? How should we understand it? What or who should we use to help us 
understand it? When should we understand it? To what extent, and to what ends? The doctrine 
therefore seeks to impose a degree of relative simplicity. It commences with Sun Tzu’s classic 
maxim, ‘Know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril’.23 Yet 
even this seductively straightforward observation demands the response: how easy is it to know 
oneself, let alone the enemy? How does a white, middle class, middle aged US Marine, or a working 
class 19 year old British private soldier, understand and compensate for the influences, biases and 
institutional experiences that shape his or her perception of the world around them? And how can 
they ‘know’ the Iraqi, Libyan or Afghan that stands opposite them, those who have been subject to 
radically different shaping experiences? These issues require thinking about. Hilary Cornish and 
Claire Duncanson, for example, in their feminist analysis of British counterinsurgency methods, 
explored the subject through the prism of gender.24 They argue that rather than examining 
shortcomings in the British campaign in Afghanistan through the usual perspectives of strategy, 
                                                          
22 Principles of Mission Command: Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) Operations (December 2010) Chapter 6,  
12. 
23 JDP 04, iii 
24 Cornish and Duncanson, ‘A feminist Approach to British Counterinsurgency’ in Paul Dixon (ed) The British 
Approach to Counterinsurgency (London, Palgrave, 2012), 147-172 
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politics or resources one should instead examine the role of gender in explaining its dynamics. If 
military males tend to exhibit a preference for certain behaviours, i.e. speed, aggression, 
forcefulness, bravery and dynamism, then their inherent understanding of issues and problems are 
shaped in a way that allows these qualities and behaviours to come to the fore. In other words 
Cornish and Duncanson propose that the simple fact of being a man exerts an inexorable influence 
upon the approaches taken to countering insurgency. But if such behaviours are absolutely intrinsic 
how does one recognise and account for them? How does one build that sort of self-understanding 
into a campaign plan? 
One might argue that such overblown academic considerations are irrelevant, or at least 
peripheral, but where does one draw the line? Doctrine might ignore the complications of gender as 
a determinant of an institutional or organisational approach to counterinsurgency, yet it does place 
emphasis on culture in explaining how and why others make decisions. Others cite alternative 
theories such as ‘the wisdom of crowds’, ‘prospect theory’, ‘anchoring’ or ‘reflexivity’.25 Australian 
doctrine even refers to understanding the ‘metabolism’ of urban environments.26 Yet commentators 
such as Patrick Porter have provided persuasive counterpoints that the role of culture or obscure 
academic theories of understanding and decision-making are of limited or at least overstated 
relevance compared to framing the problem through the notion of rational strategizing.27 If he is 
correct then by focussing on the enemy’s cultural perspectives to explain their thinking, for example, 
we may well be failing to grasp the proper motivations for their actions. But some would argue that 
whatever our ambitions in this respect, they will always be flawed. If our understanding is designed 
ultimately to be instrumental, as militaries seek, then as Daniel Kahneman and Philip Tetlock argue, 
the significance of human agency in positively influencing future events is often hugely overstated. 
Kahneman, in examining the ‘illusion of understanding’, proposes that a combination of luck and 
non-events often play such a substantial but ultimately unknowable role that outcomes which might 
appear to have been under our control were never so.28  In addition Tetlock holds that the ability to 
predict and thus direct events depends not upon deep expertise or understanding. Indeed he argues 
that such qualities bestow little advantage upon practitioners. Success in that respect, he argues, will 
be dictated by the inherent predictability of a given situation. Given the inherent unpredictability of 
conflict scenarios, this would appear to question the utility of deep understanding when compared 
                                                          
25 See Andrew Mackay and Steve Tatham, Behavioural Conflict: Why Understanding People and Their 
Motivations will Prove Decisive in Future Conflict (Essex, Military Studies Press, 2011), 65-69 
26 Australian Army: Future Land Warfare Report 2014, 9. 
27 See Porter, Military Orientalism passim. See also by the same author ‘Good Anthropology, Bad History: The 
Cultural Turn in Studying War’ Parameters, 37/2, (2007), 45 - 58. 
28 Daniel Kahneman, ‘Thinking Fast and Slow’ (London, Penguin, 2011), 199. 
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to techniques of logical problem solving.29 Whether they are right or wrong, or whether Porter, 
Cornish and Duncanson et al have utterly overcomplicated their analysis of matters is to some 
extent beside the point. The fact is that the debate is a complex and on-going one, illustrative of the 
lack of consensus over what it is exactly that we should be seeking to understand, and how we 
should seek understand it. 
 An additional problem is that above the purely tactical level doctrine is tasked with reducing 
matters of tremendous complexity to a series of simple and comprehensible principles, observations 
or suggestions that are designed to be grasped by those possessed of a standard intellect.30 But 
simple doesn’t mean easy, or even feasible. It’s simple enough, in the case of stabilisation operations 
for example, to define the concept of a cross-governmental approach, i.e. simultaneous lines of 
political, economic, military and diplomatic activity in-theatre that seek to deliver the same ends.31  
Whether you are actually able do any of that is anyone’s guess. But neither is the drive for simplicity 
a bad thing, for the alternative is for doctrine to fully reveal the complexity of the subject it 
examines, which in the case of counterinsurgency, stabilisation and so-called hybrid warfare is 
potentially even more problematic than disguising it. Witness the Israeli theory of Systemic 
Operational Design (SOD) that emerged in the mid-1990’s, authored by General Shimon Naveh and 
understood only by him, it would have appeared. In its determination to understand the (Arab) 
enemy and to provide appropriate conceptual approaches to defeating him, SOD forced its 
adherents to immerse themselves in the fields of psychology, systems analysis, and architectural (for 
the purpose of urban warfare), postcolonial and postmodernist theory.32 It was intellectually 
admirable but, as the 2006 war against Hezbollah revealed, practically incomprehensible.33 Reflect 
complexity it may have done, but it was also functionally useless in defeating the enemy, a problem 
that should have been predicted when Naveh himself acknowledged that his doctrine was ‘not easy 
to understand…not intended for ordinary mortals’. 34  
 
                                                          
29 See Kahneman, pp. 218-220. See also Philip E. Tetlock Expert Political Judgement: How good is it? How can 
we know? (Princeton,  2006). 
30 To clarify, this author considers themselves to possess a comparably standard intellect.  
31 Stabilisation operations: A cross-governmental approach to rescuing those states entering, suffering, or 
recovering from, failure. 
32 See Milan Vego, The Case Against Systemic Operational Design (Institute for National Strategic Studies, 
Washington DC, 2009), 70-75. Although by 2006 Israel did not officially use SOD as doctrine, campaign 
planning methods were still heavily influenced by its language and ethos. 
33 ‘Systemic Operational Design focuses upon the relationships between entities within a system to develop 
rationale for systemic behaviours that accounts for the logic of the system. This is accomplished through seven 
discourses, leading to a holistic design of an operation that will facilitate planning’. See Systemic Operational 
Design: An Introduction (US Army School for Advanced Military Studies, Ft Leavenworth, 2005). 
34 Vego, 73. 
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In some ways the British-centric JDP-04 and FOE 35 have a similarly difficult task. Namely that to be 
of any real use they require military commanders and their subordinates to apply complex theories 
of knowledge to matters of anthropology, sociology, psychology, culture and any number of aspects 
of human behaviour in a way that best serves the achievement of highly fluid political objectives 
through military means. More specific doctrines such as JDN 3-11 Decision Making and Problem 
Solving: Human and Organisational Factors seek to help by exploring the highly complex themes of 
cognition and psychology, but despite best intentions at less than 50 pages it comprises more a 
lightweight pop-psychology investigation of these subjects.35 Even then, if such materials are to play 
an appropriate role in the process they must be consulted. Yet not only is there still much truth in 
Rommel’s aphorism that the British write some of the best doctrine in the world but fail to read it, 
the problem is compounded by a perceptible strand of anti-intellectualism among those it is 
targeted at. Although the three services and the Ministry of Defence are able to draw upon 
significant intellectual horsepower from among their number, in general this author notes that the 
British military prefers on the whole to inculcate in its people those sorts of behaviours and 
preferences that win the physical battle.36 Collective understanding, collective action, and speed of 
decision making are the primary qualities sought. And in order to forge an effective conceptual 
‘toolkit’ to refine these behaviours and preferences, there is a strong instructional focus upon 
common adherence to process.37 What there is not is an ingrained culture of independent thought.38 
Ultimately, there still remains a worrying mistrust of proper intellectualisation and academic 
enquiry.39  
The cause of the above is partly cultural and partly a consequence of the technical demands 
of the profession combined with the tempo of operational, training, command or staff 
appointments, all of which leaves precious little time for study. Even lengthy periods of education, 
most notably the UK Defence Academy’s year long, postgraduate level Advanced Command Staff 
Course (ACSC) require the students to squeeze their academic studies into the narrow gaps left by 
                                                          
35JDN 3-11 Ministry of Defence. (January 2013). It also uses potentially questionable case studies, specifically 
the Stanford Prison Experiment, to support its conclusions. See Section 3 (Groups and Teams Working 
Together), 4. 
36 This author has over a decade’s experience teaching senior British and international military officers. 
37 The author acknowledges, of course, that in matters of staff work certain taught processes are vitally 
important. 
38 As a senior officer in charge of training and development in the British Army recently observed, ‘There is 
little or no culture of publication in the UK military, hence no equivalent of the intense debate found…in the 
US military’. See Paul Newton, ‘Adapt or Fail: The Challenge for the Armed Forces after Blair’s Wars’ in 
Jonathan Bailey, Richard Iron and Huw Strachan British Generals in Blair’s Wars, 319 
39 See Andrew Mackay ‘Behavioural Conflict: From General to Strategic Corporal’ in, Britain’s Generals in Blair’s 
Wars (Ashgate, Farnham 2013) 249-265. See also Newton, 297-327. 
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intensive staff training, leaving little time to grapple with obscure doctrine and academic theories.40 
It may also, in a broader sense, reflect a cultural preference for the sort of instinctive, practically 
informed intelligence advocated by Clausewitz rather than that based on theoretical book-learning. 
But then one still has to read Clausewitz to understand why he favours the former over the latter.41 
One can immediately sense the problems at hand. If ‘understanding’ is to be achieved then 
beyond reminding practitioners that it is important it is unlikely that formal military education or 
doctrine can play any significant role in encouraging the process. The former is compromised by an 
inherent culture of instruction and by the limited amount of time available to properly explore 
complex concepts, while the latter can never really satisfy the twin requirements of being easy 
enough to comprehend while accurately reflecting the proper complexity of the subject matter it 
deals with. In addition, very few within the military have the time or the inclination to read it, and if 
the subject matter is one that theoretically affects cross-government activity, then it has to be 
acknowledged that if military officers are unlikely to be reading their own doctrine then it is even 
less likely that their counterparts across Government are doing so.  
The alternative of course is for individual commanders to take the lead in equipping 
themselves and their subordinates with the intellectual armoury required for the purpose of 
‘understanding’. An example of this can be found in the actions of the British Army’s 52 Brigade prior 
to their deployment to Helmand in 2007-8. Under the leadership of Brigadier Andrew Mackay, the 
unit’s command group undertook concerted prior engagement with a variety of seemingly 
outlandish academic texts and theories relating to the subjects of understanding and influence. This 
was held by Mackay to be a fundamental component of the Brigade’s subsequent success on 
operations.42 The problems with this approach are not difficult to identify however. Firstly, when 
trying to measure the impact of military activities upon a particular situation, how does one really 
distinguish between association, causation, and effect? How can one be sure that one’s actions are 
definitely responsible for changes in the enemy’s behaviours, and what exactly are the metrics for 
measurement in this respect? Secondly, unless the approach to learning is uniform then each 
successive Brigade (as an example of the most likely size of self-contained force on operations) will 
arrive in theatre with utterly differing degrees of intellectual preparation and may therefore pursue 
                                                          
40 Readers of JDP 04 are instructed to also consult NATO’s AJP (Allied Joint Publication)-2 (Joint Intelligence, 
Counter Intelligence and Security Doctrine), JDP’s 01 (Campaigning), 2-00 (Understanding and Intelligence in 
Support of Joint Operations), 3-00 (Campaign Execution), 3-40 (Security and Stabilisation: the Military 
Contribution), 5-00 (Campaign Planning), and 6-00 (Communications and Information Systems Support to Joint 
Operations) and JDN 3-11 (Decision-Making and Problem Solving: Human and Organisational Factors). 
41 For a deeper examination of the British Army’s intellectual traditions see David French Raising Churchill’s 
Army (Oxford, 2001) and Army, Empire and Cold War: The British Army and Military Policy 1945-71 (Oxford 
2012). 
42 One characterized by comparatively non-kinetic approach and culminating in the retaking of the Taliban 
stronghold of Musa Qala. See Mackay ‘Behavioural Conflict’, 249-265 
13 
 
radically different approaches, as indeed happened in Afghanistan. Lastly, sceptics might point out 
that 52 Brigade’s less ‘kinetic’ and more ‘political’ approach on operations could have been 
replicated instinctively by any number of alternative commanders, should they have so chosen. That 
they did not asks questions not so much of their levels of understanding but of the qualities and 
attributes that soldiers and their commanders might seek to be judged by, particularly by their 
peers.43 
Strategic, operational and tactical understanding 
Turning now from the theoretical to the practical aspects of the debate, one has to acknowledge 
that for the military its quest for understanding must commence not on the ground but in relation to 
those who choose military action as a viable policy option for the advancement of national interests. 
But while the subject of the political-military relationship and its role in determining the ends and 
means underpinning the use of military force is the preserve of a separate study, there are certain 
aspects of the subject worth considering in respect to this debate, particularly in application to the 
peculiarities of the British civil-military relationship over the past decade and a half.   
One of the primary tasks of any nation’s political-military interface - if it is functioning in the 
ideal sense - is to allow military commanders to understand and translate political strategic demands 
into operational realities.44 This begins with the nation’s political leadership choosing to use military 
force, progresses to the most senior levels of military command accurately understanding the 
political objectives and aspirations sought by the projected use of that force, all the way down to 
operational and tactical commanders ‘on the ground’ working to that end. Each step in the ladder 
feeds off the ‘understanding’ provided by the rungs above. Such an arrangement promotes the 
notion of a seamless transmission of political purpose from the national leadership downward 
through the military chain of command, and in return permitting the upward flow of military advice 
so as to help inform the political decision making process.  
This political-military interface is vital, but under any system of governance there are a 
number of potential weaknesses. With respect to the downward flow of understanding, political 
language, behaviour and aspirations may be so vague that military commanders might struggle to 
understand the Government’s perceived ‘end’ and how military force should deliver it. That problem 
can become exacerbated by the potential for military commanders to conduct the military planning 
process in isolation from broader political considerations, a potential dislocation of Clausewitzian 
                                                          
43 Leo Docherty, ‘Harry’s War: The Ugly Truth’ The Independent on Sunday 2nd March 2008 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/harrys-war-the-ugly-truth-790316.html   
44 See Jonathan Bailey ‘The Political Context: Why We Went to War and the Mismatch of Ends, Ways and 
Means’ in Britain’s Generals in Blair’s Wars, 5-27 
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ideals.45 Alternatively, the process of understanding and then translating political direction into 
action may lead to military commanders at various level falling prey to any number of damaging 
influences; bias, opportunism, flawed interpretation of their instructions, the pressures of peer 
judgement, their own professional career agendas, to name but a few. Or perhaps the modern 
military commander, acting within the framework of an alliance, will be unable to simultaneously 
understand and reconcile the interests of their own government, that of their allies’, and potentially 
a host nation government too (not to mention the indigenous population). As one practitioner 
pointed out, it is almost inevitable that these multiple interests will not coincide.46 
But there are also problems with the upward flow of understanding. In the worst case 
scenario it may not even happen due to political leaders simply choosing to marginalise or even, in 
extremis, ignore military advice.47 Alternatively, military advisors may choose to ‘positively’ distort 
politicians’ notions of what is possible in military terms, an observation that may fall flat in 
application to other militaries but one that has certainly been levelled at the British Army.48 The 
latter’s ambition for prominent roles in given situations, notably Helmand 2006-9, has led to 
accusations that senior military personnel sought to disguise the true ‘art of the possible’ or at least 
refrained from trying to disabuse their political masters of the wisdom of their grand designs.49 Not 
only did this cause politicians to misunderstand the extent to which a limited military solution was a 
suitable way of addressing the problems faced, so leading them onward to unwise policy decisions, 
but it also detrimentally affected the ability of those military commanders to then deliver upon their 
promises. In other words, the military can become complicit in generating a corrupt form of 
                                                          
45 See Michael Brennan and Justin Kelly, Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy Strategic Studies 
Institute, (SSI, 2009). The authors identify the ‘Operational’ level of war as an artificial construct belonging to 
the military which risks separating political leaders from the planning and prosecution of military campaigns. 
Alternatively, an analysis of the US context prior to the invasion of Iraq blames inherent ‘cognitive constraints’ 
on the part of political leaders which, by their unwillingness to devote attention to the detail of post-war 
planning,  impacted the ability of military commanders to provide appropriate advice and thus helped create 
the conditions for an insurgency to prosper. See A. Rapport, ‘The Long and Short of It: Cognitive Constraints on 
Leaders’ assessments of “Postwar” Iraq, International Security 37/3 (MIT Press, 2012/13) 133-171. 
46 Bill Rollo, ‘Campaigning and Generalship: Iraq 2008’ in Britain’s Generals in Blair’s Wars, 183 
47 Recent revelations have identified Prime Minister Tony Blair’s conduct in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq 
as a stark example of such behaviour. See Tom Bower, ‘Deceit, Narcissism and Chaos from the Charmer that 
Trashed Britain’ Sunday Times, Review, 6 March 2016. 
48 Deborah Haynes, ‘They Went into Helmand with Eyes Shut and Fingers Crossed’ The Times June 10th 2010. 
See also Stephen Grey, ‘Helmand: Anatomy of a Disaster’ Foreign Policy June 15 2010 
49 A notable exception to this was Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, who as Chief of the Defence Staff at the time of 
the lead up to the Iraq War of 2003 sought to dissuade Prime Minister Tony Blair of the wisdom of military 
involvement in Iraq, specifically the intention to pursue regime change. His tenure ended abruptly, at the 
conclusion of the l invasion. See Bower, ‘Deceit…’ 
15 
 
understanding in the first place, one that then plays out over time to their own detriment; another 
accusation that has been levelled at the British army.50   
The point to be made (emphatically) here however is not that militaries, and the British 
military in particular, are inherently corrupt in the way that they choose to understand political 
direction or indeed in the way that they might seek to influence their political masters. Simply that 
the military-political interface is inherently corruptible due to inherent flaws that are prone to 
exposure in times of uncertainty, confusion or institutional stress. Ultimately, it is all part of the 
friction that one can expect in the strategic direction of war. But it does illustrate that at the highest 
levels, the two-way process of understanding enjoyed between political leaders and their military 
commanders can be a fragile commodity. Particularly if, in the British case, senior personnel are not 
only hardwired to adopt an institutional can-do attitude but are also under pressure to advertise 
their own capabilities, as well as the capabilities and relevance of the forces under their command.51 
On the ground itself however all militaries are affected by one particular aspect of the 
politico-military relationship, notably the uneven relationship between tactical and operational 
perspectives and the wider preoccupations of those with their hands on the levers of national 
strategy. The primacy of the latter often creates a scenario whereby understanding at ground level 
in particular can become highly developed but essentially irrelevant because it offends other much 
more important considerations. In retrospect, one sees that British forces in southern Iraq 2003-11 
were placed in an invidious position. The twin demands of the Anglo-US security alliance post 9-11 
on the one hand, and an unsupportive and disillusioned domestic electorate on the other meant 
that while the British Government was interested in many things to do with Iraq, what was actually 
happening on the ground in Basra was not necessarily one of them.52 Ergo ‘understanding’ at the 
tactical and operational levels in southern Iraq only mattered if it coincided with the interests of a 
distracted and distant political leadership in London.53  
 
 
                                                          
50 For accusations that the British Army’s keenness to become involved in Iraq backfired by damaging its 
relations with US commanders, see Patrick Porter ‘Last Charge of the Knights: Iraq, Afghanistan and the Special 
Relationship’ International Affairs 86/2 (Mar., 2010), 355-375 
51 Desmond Bowen, a former MOD policy director, states that the despatch of an entire Land division to Iraq in 
2003 was primarily a military motivation. “It would be wrong to believe that the political demand was for that 
size of force”, he observed. See Bowen, ‘The Political-Military Relationship on Operations’ in Britain’s Generals 
in Blair’s Wars, 277 
52 The noted counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen states that in 2006, in conversation with a senior British 
official, the latter stated that British support of US forces in Iraq simply a matter of alliance politics. See The 
Accidental Guerrilla,(Hurst and Co, London 2008) 280. 
53 See Justin Maciejewski, ‘Best Effort’: Operation Sinbad and the Iraq Campaign’ in Britain’s Generals in Blair’s 
Wars, 157-175 
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Understanding and ‘Values’ 
Both Britain and the United States’ 2015 National Security Strategies speaks of a ‘values’ (western, 
liberal) driven foreign policy.54 Indeed, chapter one of the British version is titled ‘Our Visions, Values 
and Approach’, and the word ‘values’ appears a further 32 times in the document.55 The United 
States’ places a similar emphasis upon such sentiments.56 The argument is a well-worn one; 
governments and societies that abide by such values tend to be peaceful, have happier and more 
productive populations, and are less disruptive members of the international community.57 Thus the 
spread of these values encourages peace and stability and advances basic human interests. Of 
course, while the theory is admirable the practice is rather more troublesome. Target regimes are 
often highly resistant to soft power while the inherent contradiction of imposing the values of 
freedom and democracy at the point of a gun isn’t difficult to identify. But the politics of liberal 
intervention to one side, significant problems arise when forces deployed by the liberal West engage 
with a host nation’s own societal values. Afghanistan 2001 onward has illustrated the problem well. 
In order to generate continued domestic support for the intervention, much was made by the US 
and Britain of their enlightened intentions; a strong, central and democratically elected Afghan 
government, the emancipation of women, the elimination of corruption, the destruction of the 
opium industry and the overall enhancement of life prospects that would render the Taliban an 
irrelevance. Unfortunately,  Coalition forces came to understand that what worked best in most 
cases was a weak and almost irrelevant central government supplemented by strong (read ‘violent’) 
local actors; the perpetuation of conservative cultural values that continued to repress women; the 
permanence of corruption as a fundamental component of local patron and kin systems; the value of 
continued opium cultivation as a way of avoiding provocation; and a general adherence to a way of 
life that was essentially medieval and entirely counter to the values that western democracies hold 
dear. Afghanistan thus became a place where it was understood that a corrupt and murderous 
paedophile might in fact be the most suitable appointment as local chief of police, where the 
continued cultivation of drugs was politically desirable, and where Western Governments speaking 
the mantra of women’s rights sought to maintain the authority of an Afghan Government that had 
chosen to legalise rape.58 All of which was, unfortunately, the only logical way of ensuring even a 
modicum of success. But it was also evidently counter to the justifications given for the continuation 
                                                          
54https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-strategy-and-strategic-defence-and-
security-review-2015  
55 Ibid, 9. 
56 https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf. The word 
‘Values’ appears 28 times  
57 Some might legitimately dispute this rather rosy interpretation of the way in which the ‘West’ sees itself. 
58 ‘Hamid Karzai provokes international outrage over ‘legal rape’ law’, Daily Telegraph, 3Apr. 2009. See also ‘US 
Soldiers told to ignore sexual abuse of boys by Afghan Allies’, New York Times, 20 Sep.,  2015 
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of the campaign, which meant that a western public (and domestic political opponents) soon grew 
weary of the evident contradictions emerging in front of their eyes and support for the campaign 
rapidly dwindled.  In this way the Afghanistan intervention illustrated two pertinent points. That 
values are, in the end, a value judgement in themselves, and that the understanding generated at 
ground level may not always be positive in its identifications and recommendations. While perhaps 
ensuring that things actually function, it can ultimately have a highly corrosive effect on the public 
legitimacy of one’s strategic designs. 
 
The Transformative Nature of Military Operations 
Expeditionary military operations are often the crude equivalent of the ‘observer’ effect found in the 
physical sciences; the phenomenon whereby the measurement of certain systems cannot be 
achieved without inherently affecting those systems. In a comparable way, armed intervention 
and/or regime change can destroy existing systems and facilitate the emergence of new and 
unknown ones in their place, rendering any pre-existing knowledge irrelevant. The application of 
Western military force in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, for example, shattered political structures, 
completely re-ordered certain social hierarchies and delivered highly unpredictable criminal and 
political elements into the equation, elements whose dynamics were and are often subject to 
constant and confusing change. This creates an automatic intelligence/information gap that requires 
the time consuming accumulation of fresh knowledge. So time consuming in fact that the 
subsequent period of uncertainty and ambiguity may be measured in years. ‘Understanding’ in this 
context renders the task of tailoring initial efforts on the ground to deliver appropriate political 
effect all the more difficult, as the ‘ends’ of any ‘ends-ways-means’ dynamic soon become a 
constantly moving target on account of having to cater for the emergence of highly unpredictable 
actors with any variety of political objectives of their own.   
History provides a telling example. Traditional western understanding of the Afghan revolt of 
1841 is based upon a long-established narrative that frames the event as a xenophobic objection to 
the British occupation of Kabul. It explains that insurgent leaders and followers instinctively disputed 
British imperialism and responded by way of armed resistance.59 In fact objections to the British 
presence had their roots in complex economic and political developments that followed the 
occupation. The attempted formation of a national Afghan army and the subsequent destruction of 
the traditional patron-client relationship between warlords and their followers was compounded by 
an inflationary bubble centred upon Kabul that was driven by the presence of a British garrison 
                                                          
59 For common adherence to this trope, see Jules Wilson On Afghanistan’s Plains: the Story of Britain’s Afghan 
Wars (IB Tauris, London 2012) 
18 
 
there. The subsequent enrichment of certain segments of the merchant community at the expense 
of traditional wealth-holders combined with the cessation of subsidies to certain important 
personages resulted in the degradation of established social orders. These were all hugely powerful 
stimuli for revolt. In other words the insurgency was less an instinctive anti-imperial spasm than a 
natural consequence of the British military intervention altering the fabric of traditional Afghan 
society.60 The invasion of Iraq and the toppling of the Gaddafi regime in 2011 followed similar 
narratives. The insurgencies that followed both were not simply a response to the presence or 
actions of Western forces per se.  They were as much a response to the dismantling of structures 
and social orders that had provided the sort of rough stability that underpinned those respective 
regimes; regimes that may have been repellent, but which were comprehensible in form and 
function. In both instances military action by western forces removed that which was repellent but it 
also removed that which was previously known, and comprehensible. In the place of Saddam 
Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi emerged a vicious, swirling, directionless mass of competing ethnic 
groupings, tribes, sects, gangs, militias, warlords, terrorists and foreign elements, each with their 
own peculiar local, regional, national and transnational allegiances, alliances, economic interests and 
political aspirations. Western forces suddenly transformed the known into the unknown and, in 
certain instances, the unknowable. This has obvious implications for those who believe that pre-
knowledge of such environments will suffice.61 
 
    Iraq 2003-9: Understanding and the Law of Unintended Consequences. 
Although the NATO intervention in Libya 2011 and the on-going Syrian crisis both raise hugely 
pertinent questions on the subject of understanding, particularly the latter and the way in which a 
surfeit of ‘understanding’ can actually paralyse policymakers, the Coalition experience in Southern 
Iraq 2003-2009 encapsulates many of the complexities involved in trying to actually ’operationalise’ 
understanding in conflict scenarios and provides necessary hindsight to judge how matters have 
evolved. If the initial stages (2003-05) of Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Telic were marked by a 
fundamental lack of understanding of the political and social milieu of central and southern Iraq on 
the part of US and British forces respectively, this would simply typify the opening stages of any 
comparable counterinsurgency campaign. More interesting questions arise from the point in 2006 
when respective commands were able to forge a much more sophisticated and insightful 
                                                          
60 For an excellent analysis of the causes of the Kabul Rebellion see Malcolm Yapp ‘Disturbances in Eastern 
Afghanistan 1839-42’ Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 25/3 (1962) 499-523. 
61 In particular the British Army’s ‘Adaptive Force’, in which its constituent Brigades seek to assume regional 
specialisations, presently Central Europe and Asia, North, West, Southern and Eastern Africa, the Near East, 
the Gulf, South Asia and South East Asia. 
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understanding of the socio-political environment within which they operated. In these respects the 
example of Iraq illustrates not simply the perils of military forces operating without a firm 
understanding of their environment, but so too the unforeseen and sometimes perverse 
ramifications of decisions taken when that lack of understanding is addressed. The most interesting 
aspect however, is how these developments unfolded in such a different manner for US and British 
forces respectively. 
For the British, the early stages of their post-invasion occupation of Iraq was badly affected 
by inability of military commanders and their political advisers to identify, let alone bolster, the 
relevant political structures required to stabilise the British area of operations (AO) in Basra and 
Maysan provinces.62 No-one appeared able to understand what ‘government’ meant, where it might 
reside among competing actors and interests, or even what it should look like. Competition between 
powerful local actors in both provinces, and an initially weak national administration in Baghdad, 
only added to the general confusion. Ultimately a full and proper understanding of where true 
political power lay in the south and its relationship to powerbrokers in Baghdad was missing. It led to 
a state of affairs whereby British commanders were unable to discern who could preserve and who 
could threaten whatever established political order might be crafted; a worrying situation 
considering that the host nation ‘government’ is not only a partner institution in the conduct of a 
counterinsurgency campaign, but is the ultimate concern of it.63  
Consequently, the initial stages of the campaign saw a series of local actors installed in 
important governance positions in Basra and Maysan province, each of which was to prove 
troublesome as their vested interests caused violent clashes with other competing local elements 
and/or with rivals within the national Government in Baghdad who maintained influence in the 
south.64 Such complications were inescapable. British commanders and political advisors were trying 
to ascertain, against a perplexing background of legal confusion, constitutional upheaval and 
violence, which aspect of Iraqi government it was – local governors, national ministries or the prime 
minister’s office – that had the requisite authority over the areas that British forces operated in. 
They then, as an external actor, tried to shape that authority to best reflect their own interests: an 
incredibly complex task which, unsurprisingly, was beyond their capabilities to begin with.65   But as 
stated above, what is of real interest is what happened when courses of action that worked with 
rather than against local political dynamics could be implemented.  
                                                          
62 See Glen Rangwala ‘Counterinsurgency amid Fragmentation: The British in Southern Iraq’ Journal of 
Strategic Studies 32/3, (2009) 495-513 
63 On the subject of British difficulties in Basra during this period see Christopher Elliot, High Command: British 
Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghan Wars (London, Hurst, 2015) and Rory Stewart Occupational 
Hazards: My Time Governing Iraq (London, Picador, 2007). 
64 Rangwala, ‘Counterinsurgency and Fragmentation’, 498 
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What transpired was that for the British in southern Iraq the greater the understanding, the starker 
the solution: withdrawal from Basra. In other words, retreat. As Storrie narrates it had become clear 
by 2006 that the British presence in Basra was the problem, not the solution.66 What had originated 
as a low-key insurgency by various disaffected elements had now become a war between British 
forces and the Shi’ite Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) militia, while Basra itself had fallen prey to powerful rival 
conglomerates of politico-criminal mafias.67 The British were trapped in the midst of an intra-Shia 
power struggle that was simultaneously providing space for the troublesome advance of Iranian 
influence.68 The decision was taken therefore to reach an accommodation with the JAM, withdraw 
British forces peacefully from the city and hand over security duties to the ISF (Iraqi Security Forces) 
under Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC).  Although the JAM would effectively be given free rein in Basra 
to begin with, the arena would at least be set for Iraqi government forces to win the contest for 
legitimacy there. 
The points to make in regard to British strategy during this period are threefold. The first is 
that the decisions taken were correct. An understanding of the challenges facing their presence in 
Basra and Maysan provinces, as well as an understanding of the increasingly reluctant commitment 
of the British Government to resourcing the campaign in Southern Iraq, led Commanders onward to 
a series of decisions designed to square that particular circle.69 Their ability, and that of their staffs, 
to accurately conceptualise the intricate layers of formal and informal actors providing a framework 
for the insurgency, whilst simultaneously adjusting for both Coalition political designs and a creeping 
and malign Iranian presence, highlighted the intellectual abilities of these military professionals in 
their best light.70  
The second point to be made is that there were still significant shortcomings in British 
processes. One member of a US Human Terrain Team deployed to the city after the British had 
departed observed that the latter had focussed their attention upon political relationships among 
the local Shia militias and largely ignored the concerns of ordinary Baswaris. This elite-centric (as 
opposed to a population-centric) approach was reinforced by limited amounts of uninformative 
cultural data, much of which appeared to contain little analysis or depth. Diagrams of tribal 
structures took precedence over insights as to the grievances, hopes, aspirations and cultural 
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68 Storrie, 18 
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nuances of local people.71 There were also potentially damaging shortcomings in the way that the 
British conceptualised the role of the JAM by overestimating its legitimacy and degree of public 
support. Some viewed it as an armed provider of social services; others used their experience of 
Northern Ireland to compare it to the Orange Order movement.72 In reality it was a ruthless and 
sociopathic organisation which, once it had de facto control of Basra, implemented a vicious policy 
of repression and engaged in extortion, murder and ethnic cleansing.73 No matter the wisdom of the 
Basra ‘accommodation’, there is no doubt that the British were unprepared for the savage methods 
by which the JAM would seek to extend its remit. And although it brutally overplayed its hand, 
ultimately losing the battle of legitimacy to Iraqi Government forces, the British were nothing more 
than a hostage to fortune in that regard. Moreover, the process by which Prime Minister Nouri al-
Maliki ultimately secured legitimacy in Basra – the so-called Charge of the Knights – proved a huge 
embarrassment both to the Army and to the British Government. Despite the former always 
intending for Iraqi Government forces to ‘win’ Basra and designing a plan for that purpose, the 
operation was carried out pre-emptively and effectively behind British backs. When it stalled, The 
Iraqi Government called upon US forces to help, leaving the impression of an irrelevant British force, 
freshly ejected from Basra and effectively side-lined within its own Area of Operations (AO).74 
The sense of institutional embarrassment over the abandonment of Basra and public 
exclusion from the subsequent Iraqi-US effort to reclaim it from the JAM was palpable. The whole 
affair left an uncomfortable impression of defeat that dominated media reports at the time and 
which still lingers within the collective conscious of the British Army.75 As one US Army officer 
observed at the time, ““The British have lost Basra, if indeed they ever had it…There will be a stink 
about this that will hang around the British military”.76 As Patrick Porter uncharitably observed, 
‘With the foot of the Mahdi Army on its throat, Britain cut a deal and withdrew’.77 And while Storrie 
and others justifiably and correctly point to the deeply unpalatable scenarios which might have 
unfolded as a consequence of other courses of action being taken at the time, we can only place 
judgement on what happened. While ‘understanding’ may have solved certain immediate problems 
in Basra by way of the ‘accommodation’ it simply resulted in other unpalatable courses of action 
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having to be taken in their stead, resulting in highly problematic developments in different forms as 
time progressed.78  
The final point with respect to the British experience of Southern Iraq reinforces the 
observation that understanding only really serves ones interests if it matches the prevailing strategic 
narrative. Despite its significant shortcomings the eventual elite-centric approach pursued by the 
British actually allowed military and political interests to coincide. Both wanted out of Basra and the 
military’s understanding, both of its predicament and its possible resolution, facilitated that end. In 
other words the flawed understanding developed by the British in southern Iraq actually served their 
political interests, if not those of the people under their charge. In contrast, had the British 
Government sought to properly defeat the JAM in Basra and even resourced the effort 
appropriately, then it is unlikely that the Army’s elite-centric understanding of the ‘political terrain’ 
would have facilitated the requisite influence over the real centre of gravity, i.e. the ’human 
terrain’.79 And even had it sought, a la the US method, to embed itself among the human terrain in 
Basra there remained one insurmountable problem. Namely that British designs were ultimately 
based upon enhancing the legitimacy of the Iraqi Government with the objective of the latter being 
able (and most importantly being seen to be able) to take control of the city.  Basra was never really 
there to be ‘won’ by the British in the traditional sense; doing so would only worsen relations with 
Iraq’s Shia leadership who saw Basra as their personal bailiwick. Paradoxically therefore the lack of a 
‘population centric’ approach ended up imposing politically useful inhibitions on British objectives. It 
served the British Army, and by extension their political masters; far better in real terms than a more 
developed form of understanding which may in turn have encouraged disruptive or unachievable 
ambitions. 
In the final analysis of course, post-invasion Iraq was perhaps the paradigm of unachievable 
ambitions where western intervention was concerned. And it is here that the US experience is highly 
instructive. In 2006, taking advantage of a clumsy and brutal overplaying of its hand by Al Qaeda in 
Iraq (AQI) in its efforts to co-opt the powerful Anbar Sheikhs, US forces revolutionised their 
campaign in Iraq by abandoning their previous focus upon kinetic effect and instead embarking upon 
a concerted population-centric approach underpinned by much greater understanding of the 
political and socio-cultural dimensions of Anbar province.80  Supported in turn by an entirely new 
counterinsurgency doctrine, a surge of some 20,000 extra troops, and drawing upon the newly-won 
                                                          
78 One senior officer intimately involved at the highest levels with the British actions in Basra during this critical 
period told the author in conversation, “Nothing we could have trained for, nothing we could have learned, 
could have prepared us for what we encountered in southern Iraq”. 
79 See Payne, 213-235 
80 See Thomas Ricks, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Gamble in Iraq (London, 
Penguin, 2010) 
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support of a 130,000 strong Sunni militia army, American commanders quickly broke the spine of the 
insurgency, thus leaving the ground open for political advances and American withdrawal.81 
Unfortunately those political advances have been dangerously unpredictable, and US withdrawal has 
only exacerbated matters. As Storrie observed, despite the remarkably adaptive performance of US 
forces, the measures taken to defeat the insurgency did not result in what was ultimately required: 
the emergence of a representative Iraqi Government in Baghdad and a properly functioning unitary 
state.82 The ‘Awakening’ simply reinforced dangerous sectarian divisions as exemplified by the 
ascent to power of Shia Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki. His gradual marginalisation of Iraq’s large 
Sunni minority, particularly after the 2010 elections, has been in large part responsible for the 
recrudescence of former insurgent elements into what would become ISIS/L.83 The US military’s 
actions in Iraq 20006 onward may have been underpinned by sophisticated levels of ‘understanding’, 
but they were not enough to provide the basis for a sustainable, long-term political victory.  
Conclusion 
The British experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, amplified by concerns as to the nature of the ‘future 
operating environment’ has seemingly convinced practitioners, particularly within the Army, of the 
need for deeper understanding of their surrounds. This article has illustrated some of the potential 
problems in that respect.  But the American experience in Iraq 2006-11 should provide further food 
for thought. The US military’s approach characterised the thrust for informed comprehension on the 
part of military professionals. But at its heart the entire premise of the mission, namely the 
determination to democratise Iraq, was unfeasible. In the context of liberal interventionism and 
forced democratization, no matter how sophisticated the understanding gathered it could never 
compensate for the inherently problematic nature of Iraq’s overtly sectarian society. In the same 
way, ‘understanding’ in Afghanistan could never compensate for the inherent weakness of Afghan 
polities, nor in Libya for the byzantine and violent rivalries that would follow the removal of 
Muammar Ghadaffi from power. And indeed the recent debacle there provides a basic lesson to the 
West: some things are simply not in our gift. Consequently  the thrust for ‘understanding’ on the 
part of the military machine risks encouraging a distracting tactical perspective of a matter that 
demands recognition of certain overarching political truths. Namely that the success of external 
                                                          
81 For more on the ‘Anbar Awakening’ see Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman and Jacob N. Shapiro, ‘Testing 
the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?’ International Security 37/1 (2012), 7-40. Critically, the 
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82 Storrie, 25 
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interventions is dictated less by comprehending the local political and societal milieu than it is by 
other more fundamental considerations. In this case the inherent feasibility of the proposed 
enterprise, and the problematic way in which political actors perceive the likely success of distant 
‘ends’. 
As on-going debates illustrate, there are serious doubts as to whether military operations 
under the auspices of liberal intervention or stabilisation can ever deliver ‘success’ if the target 
societies in question are economically underdeveloped, ethnically heterogeneous or lack prior 
experience with representative government. Such societies will always face serious obstacles to 
democratization, and even outsiders with good intentions are typically unable to surmount these 
barriers no matter how hard they try, or how much they understand.84  And if British foreign policy, 
as articulated by the National Security Strategy, is inherently predicated on the notion of promoting 
democratic values and behaviours then the potential futility of realising such ambitions through the 
use of force, no matter the sophistication of ones ‘local’ understanding, is not difficult to forecast. 
First and foremost then the matter of whether the ends sought are actually feasible, whether the 
grand designs of political leaders and policymakers have a realistic chance of success taking into 
account known obstacles, is the form of understanding that should trump all others. Unless matters 
are framed in this way, then all subordinate forms of understanding become a hostage to fortune. 
Problematically such advice is unlikely to be heeded in future. Recent scholarship has identified the 
cognitive biases that encourage political leaders who prioritise long-term goals such as ‘stabilisation’ 
and ‘democratisation’ to envisage inherently favourable outcomes to their actions. They prefer to 
ignore feasibility in favour of political desirability, and tend to focus on the benefits that will accrue 
when those goals are realised rather than the necessary post-intervention measures required to 
achieve those goals.85 In transformative interventions such as Iraq or Libya, such a trend was clear 
and obvious. And so too are the implications for militaries. Unfeasible objectives set by over-
optimistic political leaders dictate that while the achievement of ground level understanding is an 
admirable and useful pursuit, in reality it may simply mean that our interventions take longer to fail. 
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